![]() Starting from this claim, I will try to supply some reasons for taking rights seriously, even in a post-Parfitian view of persons. Considering this, should we reconsider or abandon rights-talk in moral theory? I will argue for the contrary, and claim that an extreme reductionist position toward persons is flawed. However, it can-and has-been denied that persons are definite and “thick” entities, and, as such, that their supposed separateness expresses a fundamental metaphysical or normative principle. This principle states that persons exist as discrete and separate entities, and, as a consequence of this metaphysical fact, that we ought to respect the boundaries between their lives, protecting them with deontic structures such as rights. ![]() One of the main reasons for justifying rights in a moral theory originates from the principle of the separateness of persons (henceforth: SP).
0 Comments
Leave a Reply. |
AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |